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Abstract
We consider three channel models: the wiretap channel with M helpers, the K-user
multiple access wiretap channel, and the K-user interference channel with an external
eavesdropper, when no eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI) is available at
the transmitters. In each case, we establish the optimal sum secure degrees of free-
dom (s.d.o.f.) by providing achievable schemes and matching converses. We show
that the unavailability of the eavesdropper’s CSIT does not reduce the s.d.o.f. of the
wiretap channel with helpers. However, there is loss in s.d.o.f. for both the multiple
access wiretap channel and the interference channel with an external eavesdropper. In
particular, we show that in the absence of eavesdropper’s CSIT, the K-user multiple
access wiretap channel reduces to a wiretap channel with (K − 1) helpers from a sum
s.d.o.f. perspective, and the optimal sum s.d.o.f. reduces from K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1 to
K−1
K
. For
the interference channel with an external eavesdropper, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. de-
creases from K(K−1)2K−1 to
K−1
2 in the absence of the eavesdropper’s CSIT. Our results
show that the lack of eavesdropper’s CSIT does not have a significant impact on the
optimal s.d.o.f. for any of the three channel models, especially when the number of
users is large. This implies that physical layer security can be made robust to the
unavailability of eavesdropper CSIT at high signal to noise ratio (SNR) regimes by
careful modification of the achievable schemes as demonstrated in this paper.
1 Introduction
The availability of channel state information at the transmitters (CSIT) plays a crucial role
in securing wireless communication in the physical layer. In most practical scenarios, the
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CNS 13-14733, CCF 14-22111 and CCF 14-22129, and presented
in part at CISS 2013 and IEEE ISIT 2015.
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channel gains are measured by the receivers and then fed back to the transmitters, which
use the CSI to ensure security. A passive eavesdropper, however, cannot be expected to
provide CSI for its channel. In this paper, we investigate how the unavailability of the
eavesdropper’s CSIT affects the optimal secure rates for three important channel models:
the wiretap channel with helpers, the multiple access wiretap channel, and the interference
channel with an external eavesdropper.
For each of these channel models, the secrecy capacity regions remain unknown, even with
full eavesdropper CSIT. In the absence of exact capacity regions, we study the secure degrees
of freedom (s.d.o.f.) of each channel model in the high signal-to-noise (SNR) regime. For the
wiretap channel with M helpers and full eavesdropper CSIT, references [1, 2] determine the
optimal s.d.o.f. to be M
M+1
. Further, references [2, 3] determine the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for
the K-user multiple access wiretap channel with full eavesdropper CSIT to be K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1
. For
the interference channel with an external eavesdropper, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is shown to
be K(K−1)
2K−1
in references [4, 5], with full eavesdropper CSIT. In this paper, we focus on the
case when no eavesdropper CSIT is available. We show that for the wiretap channel with M
helpers, an s.d.o.f. of M
M+1
is achievable even without eavesdropper’s CSIT; thus, there is no
loss of s.d.o.f. due to the unavailability of eavesdropper CSIT in this case. For the multiple
access wiretap channel and the interference channel with an external eavesdropper, however,
the optimal s.d.o.f. decreases when there is no eavesdropper CSIT. In particular, without
eavesdropper CSIT, the K-user multiple access wiretap channel reduces to a wiretap channel
with (K − 1) helpers and the optimal sum s.d.o.f. decreases from K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1
to K−1
K
. For the
interference channel with an external eavesdropper, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. decreases from
K(K−1)
2K−1
to K−1
2
in the absence of eavesdropper CSIT.
In order to establish the optimal sum s.d.o.f., we propose achievable schemes and provide
matching converse proofs for each of these channel models. We note that any achievable
scheme for the wiretap channel with (K − 1) helpers is also an achievable scheme for the
K-user multiple access wiretap channel. Further, a converse for the K-user multiple access
wiretap channel is an upper bound for the wiretap channel with (K − 1) helpers as well.
Thus, we provide achievable schemes for the wiretap channel with helpers and a converse
for the multiple access wiretap channel. We consider both fixed and fading channel gains.
For the wiretap channel with helpers and the multiple access wiretap channel, we present
schemes based on real interference alignment [6] and vector space alignment [7] for fixed and
fading channel gains, respectively. For the interference channel, our achievable schemes are
based on asymptotic real alignment [6,8] and asymptotic vector space alignment [7] for fixed
and fading channel gains, respectively. For every channel model, we design our achievable
schemes such that, the structure of the real alignment based scheme for the case of fixed
channel gains is similar to that of the vector space alignment based scheme for the case of
fading channels. Thus, our achievable schemes indicate a loose correspondence between the
real and vector space alignment techniques.
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For the interference channel with an external eavesdropper, as in [5], every transmitter
sacrifices a part of its message space to transmit cooperative jamming signals in the form of
artificial noise. However, instead of one artificial noise block as in [5], our scheme requires
two noise blocks from each transmitter. The 2K noise blocks from the K transmitters are
then aligned at each legitimate receiver to occupy only (K + 1) block dimensions out of the
full space of 2K dimensions, thus, achieving K−1
2K
s.d.o.f. per receiver. At the eavesdropper,
however, the noise blocks do not align, and therefore, occupy the full space of 2K block
dimensions, ensuring security of the message blocks. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first scheme in the literature which uses two noise blocks at each transmitter and aligns
them in an optimal way to maximize the desired signal space at each legitimate receiver. An
interesting aspect of our proposed schemes for the interference channel is that they provide
confidentiality of the messages not only from the external eavesdropper but also from the
unintended legitimate receivers. Thus, our schemes for both fixed and fading channel gains
achieve the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for the K-user interference channel with both confidential
messages and an external eavesdropper, with no eavesdropper CSIT.
To prove the converse, we combine techniques from [2,5] and [9]. We exploit a key result in
[9] that the output entropy at a receiver whose CSIT is not available is at least as large as the
output entropy at a receiver whose CSIT is available, even when the transmitters cooperate
and transmit correlated signals. This result is similar in spirit to the least alignment lemma
in [10], where only linear transmission strategies are considered. Intuitively, no alignment
of signals is possible at the receiver whose CSIT is unavailable; therefore, the signals occupy
the maximum possible space at that receiver. We combine this insight with the techniques
of [2,5]. Specifically, we use discretized versions of the secrecy penalty lemma, which quantifies
the loss of rate due to the presence of an eavesdropper, and the role of a helper lemma,
which captures the trade-off, arising out of decodability constraints, between the message
rate and the entropy of an independent helper signal. Together, these techniques enable
us to establish the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for the multiple access wiretap channel with no
eavesdropper CSIT to be K−1
K
and the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for the interference channel with
an external eavesdropper and no eavesdropper CSIT to be K−1
2
.
1.1 Related Work
The secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel is established in [11, 12].
The s.d.o.f. of the single antenna Gaussian wiretap channel [13], and its variants [14–18]
with different fading models and CSI availability conditions, is zero. In multi-user scenarios,
however, positive s.d.o.f. values can be achieved. Each transmitters may have independent
messages of its own, as in multiple access wiretap channels introduced in [19, 20] and in-
terference channels with confidential messages introduced in [21], or may act as helpers as
in [22, 23]. While cooperative jamming strategies can improve the achievable rates [19],
i.i.d. Gaussian cooperative jamming signals limit the decoding performance of the legitimate
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receiver as well, and the s.d.o.f. achieved is still zero. Positive s.d.o.f. can be obtained by
either structured signaling [24] or non-i.i.d. Gaussian signaling [25]. The exact optimal sum
s.d.o.f. of the wiretap channel with M helpers and the K-user multiple access wiretap chan-
nel are established to be M
M+1
and K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1
, respectively in [2], when full eavesdropper’s
CSIT is available. In this paper, we show that without eavesdropper’s CSIT, the optimal
s.d.o.f. for the wiretap channel with M helpers is still M
M+1
, while the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of
the K-user multiple access wiretap channel decreases to K−1
K
.
The K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper is studied in [26]. When
the eavesdropper’s CSIT is available, [26] proposes a scheme that achieves sum s.d.o.f. of K−1
2
.
The optimal s.d.o.f. in this case, however, is established in [5] to be K(K−1)
2K−1
, using cooperative
jamming signals along with interference alignment techniques. When the eavesdropper’s
CSIT is not available, reference [26] proposes a scheme that achieves a sum s.d.o.f. of K−2
2
. In
this paper, we establish the optimal s.d.o.f. in this case to be K−1
2
. A related line of research
investigates the wiretap channel, the multiple access wiretap channel, and the broadcast
channel with an arbitrarily varying eavesdropper [27–29], when the eavesdropper CSIT is not
available. The eavesdropper’s channel is assumed to be arbitrary, without any assumptions
on its distribution, and security is guaranteed for every realization of the eavesdropper’s
channel. This models an exceptionally strong eavesdropper, which may control its own
channel in an adversarial manner. Hence, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is zero in each case
with single antenna terminals, since the eavesdropper’s channel realizations may be exactly
equal to the legitimate user’s channel realizations. On the other hand, in our model, the
eavesdropper’s channel gains are drawn from a known distribution, though the realizations
are not known at the transmitters. We show that, with this mild assumption, strictly positive
s.d.o.f. can be achieved even with single antennas at each transmitter and receiver for almost
all channel realizations for helper, multiple access, and interference networks.
2 System Model and Definitions
In this paper, we consider three fundamental channel models: the wiretap channel with
helpers, the multiple access wiretap channel, and the interference channel with an external
eavesdropper. For each channel model, we consider two scenarios of channel variation: a)
fixed channel gains, and b) fading channel gains. For the case of fixed channel gains, we
assume that the channel gains are non-zero and have been drawn independently from a
continuous distribution with bounded support and remain fixed for the duration of the
communication. On the other hand, in the fading scenario, we assume that the channel
gains are non-zero and are drawn from a common continuous distribution with bounded
support in an i.i.d. fashion in each channel use. The common continuous distribution is
known at all the terminals in the system.
Let Ω denote the collection of all channel gains in n channel uses. We assume full CSI
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Figure 1: Wiretap channel with M helpers.
at the receivers, that is, both the legitimates receivers and the eavesdropper know Ω. In the
following subsections we describe each channel model and provide the relevant definitions.
2.1 Wiretap Channel with Helpers
The wiretap channel with M helpers, see Fig. 1, is described by,
Y (t) =h1(t)X1(t) +
M+1∑
i=2
hi(t)Xi(t) +N1(t) (1)
Z(t) =g1(t)X1(t) +
M+1∑
i=2
gi(t)Xi(t) +N2(t) (2)
where X1(t) denotes the channel input of the legitimate transmitter, and Y (t) denotes the
channel output at the legitimate receiver, at time t. X(i), i = 2, . . . ,M + 1, are the channel
inputs of the M helpers, and Z(t) denotes the channel output at the eavesdropper, at time
t. In addition, N1(t) and N2(t) are white Gaussian noise variables with zero-mean and unit-
variance. Here, hi(t), gi(t) are the channel gains of the users to the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper, respectively, and gi(t)s are not known at any of the transmitters. All
channel inputs are subject to the average power constraint E[Xi(t)
2] ≤ P , i = 1, . . . ,M +1.
The legitimate transmitter wishes to transmit a messageW which is uniformly distributed
inW. A secure rate R, with R = log |W|
n
is achievable if there exists a sequence of codes which
satisfy the reliability constraints at the legitimate receiver, namely, Pr[W 6= Wˆ ] ≤ ǫn, and
the secrecy constraint, namely,
1
n
I(W ;Zn,Ω) ≤ ǫn (3)
where ǫn → 0 as n → ∞. The supremum of all achievable secure rates R is the secrecy
5
W1
W2
Wˆ1, Wˆ2, . . . , WˆK
h1
h2
g2
g1
WK
W1,W2, . . . ,WK
hK
gK
Y
Z
X1
X2
XK
W3 X3
h3
g3
N1
N2
Figure 2: K-user multiple access wiretap channel.
capacity Cs and the s.d.o.f., ds, is defined as
ds = lim
P→∞
Cs
1
2
logP
(4)
2.2 Multiple Access Wiretap Channel
The K-user multiple access wiretap channel, see Fig. 2, is described by,
Y (t) =
K∑
i=1
hi(t)Xi(t) +N1(t) (5)
Z(t) =
K∑
i=1
gi(t)Xi(t) +N2(t) (6)
where Xi(t) denotes the ith user’s channel input, Y (t) denotes the legitimate receiver’s
channel output, and Z(t) denotes the eavesdropper’s channel output, at time t. In addition,
N1(t) and N2(t) are white Gaussian noise variables with zero-mean and unit-variance. Here,
hi(t), gi(t) are the channel gains of the users to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper,
respectively, and gi(t)s are not known at any of the transmitters. All channel inputs are
subject to the average power constraint E[Xi(t)
2] ≤ P , i = 1, . . . , K.
The ith user transmits message Wi which is uniformly distributed in Wi. A secure rate
tuple (R1, . . . , RK), with Ri =
log |Wi|
n
is achievable if there exists a sequence of codes which
satisfy the reliability constraints at the legitimate receiver, namely, Pr[Wi 6= Wˆi] ≤ ǫn, for
i = 1, . . . , K, and the secrecy constraint, namely,
1
n
I(WK1 ;Z
n,Ω) ≤ ǫn (7)
where ǫn → 0 as n→∞. Here, WK1 denotes the set of all the messages, i.e., {W1, . . . ,WK}.
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Figure 3: K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper.
An s.d.o.f. tuple (d1, . . . , dK) is said to be achievable if a rate tuple (R1, . . . , RK) is achievable
with di = lim
P→∞
Ri
1
2
logP
. The sum s.d.o.f., ds, is the largest achievable
∑K
i=1 di.
2.3 Interference Channel with External Eavesdropper
The K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper, see Fig. 3, is described by
Yi(t) =
K∑
j=1
hji(t)Xj(t) +Ni(t), i = 1, . . . , K (8)
Z(t) =
K∑
j=1
gj(t)Xj(t) +NZ(t) (9)
where Yi(t) is the channel output of receiver i, Z(t) is the channel output at the eavesdrop-
per, Xj(t) is the channel input of transmitter j, hji(t) is the channel gain from transmit-
ter j to receiver i, gj(t) is the channel gain from transmitter j to the eavesdropper, and
{N1(t), . . . , NK(t), NZ(t)} are mutually independent zero-mean unit-variance white Gaus-
sian noise random variables, at time t. The channel gains to the eavesdropper, gi(t)s are
not known at any of the transmitters. All channel inputs are subject to the average power
constraint E[Xi(t)
2] ≤ P , i = 1, . . . , K.
Transmitter i wishes to send a message Wi, chosen uniformly from a set Wi, to receiver
i. The messages W1, . . . ,WK are mutually independent. A secure rate tuple (R1, . . . , RK),
with Ri =
log |Wi|
n
is achievable if there exists a sequence of codes which satisfy the reliability
constraints at all the legitimate receivers, namely, Pr[Wi 6= Wˆi] ≤ ǫn, for i = 1, . . . , K, and
the security condition
1
n
I(WK1 ;Z
n,Ω) ≤ ǫn (10)
where ǫn → 0, as n → ∞. An s.d.o.f. tuple (d1, . . . , dK) is said to be achievable if a rate
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tuple (R1, . . . , RK) is achievable with di = lim
P→∞
Ri
1
2
logP
. The sum s.d.o.f., ds, is the largest
achievable
∑K
i=1 di.
3 Main Results and Discussion
In this section, we state the main results of this paper. We have the following theorems:
Theorem 1 For the wiretap channel with M helpers and no eavesdropper CSIT, the optimal
sum s.d.o.f., ds, is given by,
ds =
M
M + 1
(11)
almost surely, for both fixed and fading channel gains.
Theorem 2 For the K-user multiple access wiretap channel with no eavesdropper CSIT,
the optimal sum s.d.o.f., ds, is given by,
ds =
K − 1
K
(12)
almost surely, for both fixed and fading channel gains.
Theorem 3 For the K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper with no
eavesdropper CSIT, the optimal sum s.d.o.f., ds, is given by,
ds =
K − 1
2
(13)
almost surely, for both fixed and fading channel gains.
We present the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 in Section 4 and the proof of Theorem 3 in
Section 5. Let us first state a corollary obtained from Theorems 1 and 2, which establishes
the entire s.d.o.f. region of the K-user multiple access wiretap channel with no eavesdropper
CSIT.
Corollary 1 The s.d.o.f. region of the K-user multiple access wiretap channel with no eaves-
dropper CSIT is given by,
di ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , K, and
K∑
i=1
di ≤K − 1
K
(14)
The proof of Corollary 1 follows directly from Theorems 1 and 2. In particular, we can
treat the K-user multiple access wiretap channel as a (K − 1) helper wiretap channel with
transmitter i as the legitimate transmitter, and the remaining transmitters as helpers. This
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Channel model With Eve CSIT Without Eve CSIT
Wiretap channel with M helpers M
M+1
M
M+1
K-user multiple access wiretap
channel
K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1
K−1
K
K-user interference channel with
an external eavesdropper
K(K−1)
2K−1
K−1
2
Table 1: Summary of s.d.o.f. values with and without eavesdropper CSIT.
achieves the corner points di =
K−1
K
and dj = 0 for j 6= i from Theorem 1. Therefore, given
the sum s.d.o.f. upper bound in Theorem 2, and that each corner point with s.d.o.f. of K−1
K
for a single user is achievable, the region in Corollary 1 follows.
It is useful, at this point, to compare our results to the cases when the eavesdropper’s
CSI is available at the transmitter. Table 1 shows a comparison of the optimal s.d.o.f. values
with and without eavesdropper CSIT. Interestingly, there is no loss in s.d.o.f. for the wiretap
channel with helpers due to the absence of eavesdropper’s CSIT.
However, for the multiple access wiretap channel and the interference channel with an
external eavesdropper, the optimal s.d.o.f. decreases due to the unavailability of eavesdropper
CSIT. For the multiple access wiretap channel, as the number of users, K increases, the
optimal sum s.d.o.f. approaches 1 as ∼ 1
K2
with eavesdropper’s CSIT but only as ∼ 1
K
without eavesdropper’s CSIT. Therefore, the loss of s.d.o.f. as a fraction of the optimal sum
s.d.o.f. with eavesdropper CSIT is ∼ 1
K
for large K.
For the interference channel with an external eavesdropper too, there is a loss in s.d.o.f. due
to the unavailability of the eavesdropper’s CSIT. However, in this case, the optimal s.d.o.f. with-
out eavesdropper CSIT closely tracks the s.d.o.f. with eavesdropper CSIT. In fact, it can be
verified that the s.d.o.f. loss is bounded by 1
4
, which implies that the loss of s.d.o.f. as a
fraction of the optimal s.d.o.f. with eavesdropper CSIT is ∼ 1
K
for large K, in this case also.
For the multiple access wiretap channel, we also consider the case where some of the
transmitters have the eavesdropper’s CSI. We state our achievable s.d.o.f. in this case in the
following theorem.
Theorem 4 In the K-user MAC-WT, where 1 ≤ m ≤ K transmitters have eavesdropper
CSI, and the remaining K − m transmitters have no eavesdropper CSI, the following sum
s.d.o.f. is achievable,
ds =
m(K − 1)
m(K − 1) + 1 (15)
almost surely, for both fixed and fading channel gains.
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We present the proof of Theorem 4 in Section 6. In this case, we note that when only one
user has eavesdropper CSIT, i.e., m = 1, our achievable rate is the same as when no user has
eavesdropper CSIT as in Theorem 2. On the other hand, when all users have eavesdropper
CSIT, i.e., m = K, our achievable rate is the same as the optimal sum s.d.o.f. in [2]. We note
that our achievable sum s.d.o.f. varies from the no eavesdropper CSIT result in Theorem 2
to the full eavesdropper CSIT sum s.d.o.f. in [2] as m increases from 1 to K.
4 Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
First, we note that an achievable scheme for Theorem 1 implies an achievable scheme for
Theorem 2, since the K-user multiple access wiretap channel may be treated as a wiretap
channel with (K − 1) helpers. Further, we note that a converse for Theorem 2 suffices as
a converse for Theorem 1. Thus, we will only provide achievable schemes for Theorem 1
and a converse proof for Theorem 2. An alternate converse for Theorem 1 also follows from
the converse presented in [2] for the wiretap channel with M helpers and with eavesdropper
CSIT, as the converse for the case of known eavesdropper CSIT serves as a converse for the
case of unknown eavesdropper CSIT.
4.1 Achievability for the Wiretap Channel with Helpers
We now present achievable schemes for the wiretap channel with M helpers for both fixed
and fading channels. We begin with the case of fixed channel gains.
4.1.1 Fixed Channel Gains
For fixed channels, we use the technique of real interference alignment [6,8]. Let {V2, V3, · · · ,
VM+1, U1, U2, U3, · · · , UM+1} be mutually independent discrete random variables, each of
which uniformly drawn from the same PAM constellation C(a,Q)
C(a,Q) = a{−Q,−Q + 1, . . . , Q− 1, Q} (16)
where Q is a positive integer and a is a real number used to normalize the transmission power,
and is also the minimum distance between the points belonging to C(a,Q). Exact values of
a and Q will be specified later. We choose the input signal of the legitimate transmitter as
X1 =
1
h1
U1 +
M+1∑
k=2
αkVk (17)
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where {αk}M+1k=2 are rationally independent among themselves and also rationally independent
of all channel gains. The input signal of the jth helper, j = 2, · · · ,M + 1, is chosen as
Xj =
1
hj
Uj (18)
Note that, neither the legitimate transmitter signal in (17) nor the helper signals in (18)
depend on the eavesdropper CSI {gk}M+1k=1 . With these selections, observations of the receivers
are given by,
Y =
M+1∑
k=2
h1αkVk +
(
M+1∑
j=1
Uj
)
+N1 (19)
Z =
M+1∑
k=2
g1αkVk +
M+1∑
j=1
gj
hj
Uj +N2 (20)
The intuition here is as follows: We useM independent sub-signals Vk, k = 2, · · · ,M+1,
to represent the original message W . The input signal X1 is a linear combination of Vks
and a jamming signal U1. At the legitimate receiver, all of the cooperative jamming sig-
nals, Uks, are aligned such that they occupy a small portion of the signal space. Since
{1, h1α2, h1α3, · · · , h1αM+1} are rationally independent for all channel gains, except for a set
of Lebesgue measure zero, the signals
{
V2, V3, · · · , VM+1,
∑M+1
j=1 Uj
}
can be distinguished by
the legitimate receiver. In addition, we observe that
{
g1
h1
, · · · , gM+1
hM+1
}
are rationally inde-
pendent, and therefore, {U1, U2, · · · , UM+1} span the entire space at the eavesdropper; see
Fig. 4. Here, by the entire space, we mean the maximum number of dimensions that the
eavesdropper is capable of decoding, which is (M + 1) in this case. Since the entire space
at the eavesdropper is occupied by the cooperative jamming signals, the message signals
{V2, V3, · · · , VM+1} are secure, as we will mathematically prove in the sequel.
The following secrecy rate is achievable [12]
Cs ≥ I(V; Y )− I(V;Z) (21)
where V
∆
= {V2, V3, · · · , VM+1}. Note that since Ω is known at both the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper, it can be considered to be an additional output at both the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper. Further, since V is chosen to be independent of Ω, Ω should
appear in the conditioning of each of the mutual information quantities in (21). We keep
this in mind, but drop it for the sake of notational simplicity.
First, we use Fano’s inequality to bound the first term in (21). Note that the space
observed at receiver 1 consists of (2Q+ 1)M(2MQ+ 2Q+ 1) points in (M + 1) dimensions,
and the sub-signal in each dimension is drawn from a constellation of C(a, (M +1)Q). Here,
we use the property that C(a,Q) ⊂ C(a, (M + 1)Q). By using the Khintchine-Groshev
11
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Figure 4: Illustration of the alignment scheme for the Gaussian wiretap channel with M
helpers with no eavesdropper CSI.
theorem of Diophantine approximation in number theory [6,8], we can bound the minimum
distance dmin between the points in receiver 1’s space as follows: For any δ > 0, there exists
a constant kδ such that
dmin ≥ kδa
((M + 1)Q)M+δ
(22)
for almost all rationally independent {1, h1α2, h1α3, · · · , h1αM+1}, except for a set of Lebesgue
measure zero. Then, we can upper bound the probability of decoding error of such a PAM
scheme by considering the additive Gaussian noise at receiver 1,
P
[
V 6= Vˆ
]
≤ exp
(
−d
2
min
8
)
(23)
≤ exp
(
− a
2k2δ
8((M + 1)Q)2(M+δ)
)
(24)
where Vˆ is the estimate of V by choosing the closest point in the constellation based on
observation Y . For any δ > 0, if we choose Q = P
1−δ
2(M+1+δ) and a = γP
1
2/Q, where γ is a
constant independent of P , then
P
[
V 6= Vˆ
]
≤ exp
(
− k
2
δγ
2(M + 1)2P
8((M + 1)Q)2(M+δ)+2
)
(25)
= exp
(
− k
2
δγ
2(M + 1)2P δ
8(M + 1)2(M+1+δ)
)
(26)
and we can have P
[
V 6= Vˆ
]
→ 0 as P → ∞. To satisfy the power constraint at the
transmitters, we can simply choose
γ ≤ min


[
1
|h1| +
M+1∑
k=2
|αk|
]−1
, |h2|, |h3|, · · · , |hM+1|

 (27)
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By Fano’s inequality and the Markov chain V→ Y → Vˆ, we know that
H(V|Y ) ≤ H(V|Vˆ) (28)
≤ 1 + exp
(
− k
2
δγ
2(M + 1)2P δ
8(M + 1)2(M+1+δ)
)
log(2Q+ 1)M (29)
= o(logP ) (30)
where δ and γ are fixed, and o(·) is the little-o function. This means that
I(V; Y ) = H(V)−H(V|Y ) (31)
≥ H(V)− o(logP ) (32)
= log(2Q+ 1)M − o(logP ) (33)
≥ logP M(1−δ)2(M+1+δ) − o(logP ) (34)
=
M(1 − δ)
M + 1 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
− o(logP ) (35)
Next, we need to bound the second term in (21),
I(V;Z) = I(V,U;Z)− I(U;Z|V) (36)
= I(V,U;Z)−H(U|V) +H(U|Z,V) (37)
= I(V,U;Z)−H(U) +H(U|Z,V) (38)
= h(Z)− h(Z|V,U)−H(U) +H(U|Z,V) (39)
= h(Z)− h(N2)−H(U) +H(U|Z,V) (40)
≤ h(Z)− h(N2)−H(U) + o(logP ) (41)
≤ 1
2
logP − 1
2
log 2πe− log(2Q+ 1)M+1 + o(logP ) (42)
≤ 1
2
logP − (M + 1)(1− δ)
2(M + 1 + δ)
logP + o(logP ) (43)
=
(M + 2)δ
M + 1 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (44)
where U
∆
= {U1, U2, · · · , UM+1}, and (41) is due to the fact that given V and Z, the eaves-
dropper can decode U with probability of error approaching zero since
{
g1
h1
, · · · , gM+1
hM+1
}
are
rationally independent for all channel gains, except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero.
Then, by Fano’s inequality, H(U|Z,V) ≤ o(logP ) similar to the step in (30). In addi-
tion, h(Z) ≤ 1
2
logP + o(logP ) in (42), since all the channel gains are drawn from a known
distribution with bounded support.
Combining (35) and (44), we have
Cs ≥ I(V; Y )− I(V;Z) (45)
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≥ M(1 − δ)
M + 1 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
− (M + 2)δ
M + 1 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
− o(logP ) (46)
=
M − (2M + 2)δ
M + 1 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
− o(logP ) (47)
where again o(·) is the little-o function. If we choose δ arbitrarily small, then we can achieve
M
M+1
s.d.o.f. for this model where there is no eavesdropper CSI at the transmitters.
4.1.2 Fading Channel Gains
Now, we present an achievable scheme for the case of fading channel gains, i.e., when the
channel gains vary in an i.i.d. fashion from one time slot to another. In this scheme, the
legitimate transmitter sendsM independent Gaussian symbols, V = {V2, . . . , VM+1} securely
to the legitimate receiver in (M + 1) time slots. This is done as follows:
At time t = 1, . . . ,M + 1, the legitimate transmitter sends a scaled artificial noise, i.e.,
cooperative jamming, symbol U1 along with information symbols as,
X1(t) =
1
h1(t)
U1 +
M+1∑
k=2
αk(t)Vk (48)
where the αk(t)s are chosen such that the (M + 1)× (M + 1) matrix T , with entries Tij =
αi(j)h1(j), where α1(j) =
1
h1(j)
, is full rank. The jth helper, j = 2, . . . ,M + 1, transmits:
Xj(t) =
1
hj(t)
Uj (49)
The channel outputs at time t are,
Y (t) =
M+1∑
k=2
h1(t)αk(t)Vk +
(
M+1∑
j=1
Uj
)
+N1(t) (50)
Z(t) =
M+1∑
k=2
g1(t)αk(t)Vk +
M+1∑
j=1
gj(t)
hj(t)
Uj +N2(t) (51)
Note the similarity of the scheme with that of the real interference scheme for fixed
channel gains, i.e., the similarity between (50)-(51) and (19)-(20). Indeed the alignment
structure after (M +1) channel uses is exactly as in Fig. 4. Note also how the artificial noise
symbols align at the legitimate receiver over (M +1) time slots. At high SNR, at the end of
the (M + 1) slots, the legitimate receiver recovers (M + 1) linearly independent equations
with (M + 1) variables: V2, . . . , VM+1,
∑M+1
j=1 Uj. Thus, the legitimate receiver can recover
V
∆
= (V2, . . . , VM+1) within noise variance.
Formally, let us define U
∆
= (U1, . . . , UM+1), Y
∆
= (Y (1), . . . , Y (M + 1)), and Z
∆
=
(Z(1), . . . , Z(M + 1)). The observations at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
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can then be compactly written as
Y = (AV ,AU)
(
VT
UT
)
+N1 (52)
Z = (BV ,BU)
(
VT
UT
)
+N2 (53)
where AV is a (M + 1)×M matrix with (AV )ij = h1(i)αj+1(i), AU is a (M + 1)× (M + 1)
matrix with all ones, BV is a (M + 1) × M matrix with (BV )ij = g1(i)αj+1(i), and BU
is a (M + 1) × (M + 1) matrix with (BV )ij = gj(i)hj(i) . N1 and N2 are (M + 1) dimensional
vectors containing the noise variables N1(t) and N2(t), respectively, for t = 1, . . . ,M +1. To
calculate differential entropies, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let A be an M ×N dimensional matrix and let X = (X1, . . . , XN)T be a jointly
Gaussian random vector with zero-mean and variance P I. Also, let N = (N1, . . . , NM)
T
be
a jointly Gaussian random vector with zero-mean and variance σ2I, independent of X. If
r = rank(A), then,
h(AX+N) = r
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (54)
We present the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix A.
Using Lemma 1, we compute
I(V;Y) =h(Y)− h(Y|V) (55)
=(M + 1)
1
2
logP − h(AUUT +N1) + o(logP ) (56)
=(M + 1)
(
1
2
logP
)
− 1
2
logP + o(logP ) (57)
=M
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (58)
where (56) follows since U and N1 are independent of V and since (AV ,AU) has rank
(M + 1), and (57) follows since AU has rank 1. We also have,
I(V;Z) =h(Z)− h(Z|V) (59)
=(M + 1)
1
2
logP − h(BUUT +N2) + o(logP ) (60)
=(M + 1)
1
2
logP − (M + 1)1
2
logP + o(logP ) (61)
=o(logP ) (62)
where we have used the fact that both (BV ,BU) and BU have rank (M + 1), almost surely.
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Note that, in both calculations above, we have implicitly used the fact that Ω is known to
both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, and that it appears in the conditioning
of each mutual information and differential entropy term. Equation (62) means that the
leakage to the eavesdropper does not scale with logP .
Now, consider the vector wiretap channel from V to Y and Z, by treating the K slots in
the scheme above as one channel use. Similar to (21), the following secrecy rate is achievable
Cvecs ≥I(V;Y)− I(V;Z) (63)
=M
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (64)
Since each channel use of this vector channel uses (M+1) actual channel uses, the achievable
rate for the actual channel is,
Cs ≥ M
M + 1
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (65)
Thus, the achievable s.d.o.f. of this scheme is M
M+1
. The results in (47) and (65) complete
the achievability of Theorem 1, for fixed and fading channel gains, respectively.
4.2 Converse for the Multiple Access Wiretap Channel
We combine techniques from [2] and [9] to prove the converse. Here, we use Xi to denote the
collection of all channel inputs {Xi(t), t = 1, . . . , n} of transmitter i. Similarly, we useY and
Z to denote the channel outputs at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively,
over n channel uses. We further define XK1 as the collection of all channel inputs from all
of the transmitters, i.e., {Xi, i = 1 . . . , K}. Finally, for a fixed j, we use X−j to denote all
channel inputs from all transmitters except transmitter j, i.e., {Xi, i 6= j, i = 1 . . . , K}.
Since all receivers know Ω, it appears in the conditioning in every entropy and mutual
information term below. We keep this in mind, but drop it for the sake of notational
simplicity. We divide the proof into three steps.
4.2.1 Deterministic Channel Model
We will show that there is no loss of s.d.o.f. in considering the following integer-input integer-
output deterministic channel in (66)-(67) instead of the one in (5)-(6)
Y (t) =
K∑
i=1
⌊hi(t)Xi(t)⌋ (66)
Z(t) =
K∑
i=1
⌊gi(t)Xi(t)⌋ (67)
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with the constraint that
Xi ∈
{
0, 1, . . . ,
⌊√
P
⌋}
(68)
To that end, we will show that given any codeword tuple (XG1 , . . . ,X
G
K) for the origi-
nal channel of (5)-(6), we can construct a codeword tuple (XD1 , . . . ,X
D
K) with X
D
i (t) =⌊
XGi (t)
⌋
mod ⌊√P⌋, for the deterministic channel of (66)-(67), that achieves an s.d.o.f. no
smaller than the s.d.o.f. achieved by (XG1 , . . . ,X
G
K) on the original channel. Let us denote by
YG and ZG, the outputs of the original channel of (5)-(6), when (XG1 , . . . ,X
G
K) is the input,
that is,
Y G(t)
∆
=
K∑
i=1
hi(t)X
G
i (t) +N1(t) (69)
ZG(t)
∆
=
K∑
i=1
gi(t)X
G
i (t) +N2(t) (70)
Similarly, define
Y D(t)
∆
=
K∑
i=1
⌊
hi(t)X
D
i (t)
⌋
(71)
ZD(t)
∆
=
K∑
i=1
⌊
gi(t)X
D
i (t)
⌋
(72)
It suffices to show that
I(Wi;Y
G) ≤I(Wi;YD) + no(logP ) (73)
I(WK1 ;Z
D) ≤I(WK1 ;ZG) + no(logP ) (74)
for every i = 1, . . . , K. Here, (73) states that the information rate to the legitimate receiver
in the discretized channel is at least as large as the information rate in the original Gaussian
channel, and (74) states that the information leakage to the eavesdropper in the discretized
channel is at most at the level of the information leakage in the original Gaussian channel,
both of which quantified within a o(logP ).
The proof of (73) follows along similar lines as the proof presented in [9] and is omitted
here. To prove (74), we first define
Z¯(t)
∆
=
K∑
i=1
⌊
gi(t)
⌊
XGi (t)
⌋⌋
(75)
Zˆ(t)
∆
=Z¯(t)− ZD(t) (76)
Z˜(t)
∆
=
⌊
ZG(t)
⌋− Z¯(t)− ⌊N2(t)⌋ (77)
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Then, we have,
I(WK1 ;Z
D) ≤I(WK1 ;ZD,ZG, Z¯) (78)
=I(WK1 ;Z
G) + I(WK1 ; Z¯|ZG) + I(WK1 ;ZD|Z¯,ZG) (79)
≤I(WK1 ;ZG) +H(Z¯|ZG) +H(ZD|Z¯,ZG) (80)
≤I(WK1 ;ZG) +H(Z¯|⌊ZG⌋) +H(ZD|Z¯) (81)
≤I(WK1 ;ZG) +H(Z¯|Z¯+ Z˜+ ⌊N2⌋) +H(Zˆ) (82)
≤I(WK1 ;ZG) +
n∑
i=1
H(Z¯(t)|Z¯(t) + Z˜(t) + ⌊N2(t)⌋) +
n∑
i=1
H(Zˆ(t)) (83)
≤I(WK1 ;ZG) + no(logP ) (84)
where ⌊ZG⌋ = (⌊ZG(1)⌋, . . . , ⌊ZG(n)⌋). Here, (84) follows since H(Zˆ(t)) ≤ o(logP ) fol-
lowing the steps of the proof in [9, Appendix A.2]. In addition, recalling that Ω appears
in the conditioning of each term in (83), note that H(Z¯(t)|Z¯(t) + Z˜(t) + ⌊N2(t)⌋ ,Ω) ≤
E
[
H(Z¯(t)|Z¯(t) + Z˜(t) + ⌊N2(t)⌋ , gK1 = g˜K1 )
]
≤ o(logP ) using [30, Lemma E.1, Appendix E],
since Z˜(t) is integer valued and is bounded by
∑K
i=1 g˜i(t) +K + 1 for each realization g˜i(t)
of gi(t).
Therefore, the s.d.o.f. of the deterministic channel in (66)-(67) with integer channel in-
puts as described in (68) is no smaller than the s.d.o.f. of the original channel in (5)-(6).
Consequently, any upper bound (e.g., converse) developed for the s.d.o.f. of (66)-(67) will
serve as an upper bound for the s.d.o.f. of (5)-(6). Thus, we will consider this deterministic
channel in the remaining part of the converse.
4.2.2 An Upper Bound on the Sum Rate
We begin as in the secrecy penalty lemma in [2], i.e., [2, Lemma 1]. Note that, unlike [2,
Lemma 1], channel inputs are integer here and satisfy (68):
n
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤I(WK1 ;Y)− I(WK1 ;Z) + nǫ (85)
≤I(WK1 ;Y|Z) + nǫ (86)
≤I(XK1 ;Y|Z) + nǫ (87)
≤H(Y|Z) + nǫ (88)
=H(Y,Z)−H(Z) + nǫ (89)
≤H(XK1 ,Y,Z)−H(Z) + nǫ (90)
=H(XK1 )−H(Z) + nǫ (91)
≤
K∑
k=1
H(Xk)−H(Z) + nǫ (92)
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where (91) follows since H(Y,Z|XK1 ) = 0 for the channel in (66)-(67). Also, to ensure
decodability at the legitimate receiver, we use the role of a helper lemma in [2], i.e., [2,
Lemma 2],
n
∑
i 6=j
Ri ≤I(W−j;Y) + nǫ′ (93)
≤I(X−j;Y) + nǫ′ (94)
=H(Y)−H(Y|X−j) + nǫ′ (95)
=H(Y)−H(⌊hjXj⌋) + nǫ′ (96)
=H(Y)−H(⌊hjXj⌋ ,Xj) +H(Xj| ⌊hjXj⌋) + nǫ′ (97)
≤H(Y)−H(Xj) +H(Xj| ⌊hjXj⌋) + nǫ′ (98)
≤H(Y)−H(Xj) +
n∑
t=1
H(Xj(t)| ⌊hj(t)Xj(t)⌋) + nǫ′ (99)
≤H(Y)−H(Xj) + nǫ′ + nc (100)
where hjXj
∆
= {hj(t)Xj(t), t = 1, . . . , n}, and recalling that Ω appears in the conditioning of
each term in (99), (100) follows using the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let X be an integer valued random variable satisfying (68), and h be drawn from
a distribution F (h) satisfying
∫∞
−∞
log
(
1 + 1
|h|
)
dF (h) ≤ c for some c ∈ R. Then,
H(X| ⌊hX⌋ , h) ≤ c (101)
The proof of this lemma is presented in Appendix B. The constraint imposed in Lemma 2
is a mild technical condition. It can be verified that a sufficient condition for satisfying the
constraint is that there exists an ǫ > 0 such that the probability density function (pdf) is
bounded in the interval (−ǫ, ǫ). Most common distributions such as Gaussian, exponential
and Laplace satisfy this condition.
Eliminating H(Xj)s using (92) and (100), we get,
Kn
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤KH(Y)−H(Z) + nK(ǫ′ + c) + nǫ (102)
≤(K − 1)n
2
logP + (H(Y)−H(Z)) + nǫ′′ (103)
where ǫ′′ = o(logP ). Dividing by n and letting n→∞,
K
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤(K − 1)1
2
logP + ǫ′′ + lim
n→∞
1
n
(H(Y)−H(Z)) (104)
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Now dividing by 1
2
logP and taking P →∞,
K∑
i=1
di ≤K − 1
K
+
1
K
lim
P→∞
lim
n→∞
H(Y)−H(Z)
n
2
logP
(105)
4.2.3 Bounding the Difference of Entropies
We now upper bound the difference of entropies H(Y)−H(Z) in (105) as:
H(Y)−H(Z) ≤ sup
{Xi}:Xi |= Xj
H(Y)−H(Z) (106)
≤ sup
{Xi}
H(Y)−H(Z) (107)
where X |= Y is used to denote that X and Y are statistically independent and (107) follows
from (106) by relaxing the condition of independence in (106). Since the Xis in (107) may be
arbitrarily correlated, we can think of the K single antenna terminals as a single transmitter
with K antennas. Thus, we wish to maximize H(Y)−H(Z), where Y and Z are two single
antenna receiver outputs, under the constraint that the channel gains to Z are unknown at
the transmitter. This brings us to the K-user MISO broadcast channel setting of [9]. We
know from [9, eqns. (75)-(103)] that even without any security or decodability constraints,
the difference of entropies, H(Y) − H(Z) cannot be larger than no(logP ), if the channel
gains to the second receiver are unknown. Thus,
H(Y)−H(Z) ≤ no(logP ) (108)
Using (108) in (105), we have
K∑
i=1
di ≤K − 1
K
(109)
This completes the converse proof of Theorem 2.
5 Proof of Theorem 3
In this section, we present the proof of Theorem 3. We first present separate achievable
schemes for fixed and fading channel gains and then present the converse. For the interference
channel, we require asymptotic schemes with both real [8], and vector space alignment [7]
techniques. The converse combines techniques from [4] and [9].
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Figure 5: Alignment for the interference channel with K = 3.
5.1 Achievability for the Interference Channel
An achievable scheme for the interference channel with an external eavesdropper and no
eavesdropper CSIT is presented in [26, Theorem 3]. That scheme achieves sum s.d.o.f. of
K−2
2
. Here, we present the optimal schemes which achieve K−1
2
sum s.d.o.f. In this section,
we focus on the case when K = 3, which highlights the main ideas of the general K-user
scheme and present theK-user scheme in Appendix C. As in the achievability for the wiretap
channel with helpers, we use the techniques of real and vector space alignment for fixed
channel gains and fading channel gains, respectively. However, unlike the case of wiretap
channel with helpers, we need to use asymptotic alignment in each case. We begin with the
case of fixed channel gains.
5.1.1 Fixed Channel Gains
We use the technique of asymptotic real interference alignment introduced in [8]. Fig. 5
shows the desired signal alignment at the receivers and the eavesdropper. In the figure, the
boxes labeled by V denote the message symbols, while the hatched boxes labeled with U
denote artificial noise symbols. We observe from Fig. 5 that 4 out of 6 signal dimensions
are buried in the artificial noise. Thus, heuristically, the s.d.o.f. for each legitimate user pair
is 2
6
= 1
3
, and the sum s.d.o.f. is, therefore, 3 × 1
3
= 1, as expected from our optimal sum
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s.d.o.f. expression K−1
2
= 3−1
2
= 1.
In the K-user case, we have a similar alignment scheme. Each transmitter sends two
artificial noise blocks along with (K − 1) message blocks. At each legitimate receiver, the
2K noise blocks from the K transmitters align such that they occupy only (K + 1) block
dimensions. This is done by aligning U˜k with Uk+1 for k = 1, . . . , (K−1), at each legitimate
receiver. The unintended messages at each legitimate receiver are aligned underneath the
(K + 1) artificial noise dimensions. To do so, we use two main ideas. First, two blocks
from the same transmitter cannot be aligned at any receiver. This is because if two blocks
from the same transmitter align at any receiver, they align at every other receiver as well,
which is clearly not desirable. Secondly, each message block aligns with the same artificial
noise block at every unintended receiver. Thus, in Fig. 5, V21 and V24 appear in different
columns at each receiver. Further, V21 appears underneath U1 at both of the unintended
legitimate receivers 1 and 2. It can be verified that these properties hold for every message
block. As an interesting by-product, this alignment scheme provides confidentiality of the
unintended messages at the legitimate transmitters for free. The (K − 1) intended message
blocks at a legitimate receiver occupy distinct block dimensions; thus, achieving a d.o.f. of
K−1
2K
for each transmitter-receiver pair. At the eavesdropper, no alignment is possible since
its CSIT is unavailable. Thus, the 2K artificial noise blocks occupy the full space of 2K
block dimensions. This ensures security of the messages at the eavesdropper.
Note that we require two artificial noise blocks to be transmitted from each transmit-
ter. When the eavesdropper CSIT is available, the optimal achievable scheme, presented
in [5], requires one artificial noise block from each transmitter; the K noise blocks from
the K transmitters are aligned with the messages at the eavesdropper in order to ensure
security. In our case, however, the eavesdropper’s CSIT is not available. Thus, in order to
guarantee security, we need a total of 2K noise blocks to occupy the full space of 2K block
dimensions at the eavesdropper. This is achieved by sending two artificial noise blocks from
each transmitter. Further, to achieve an s.d.o.f. of K−1
2K
per user pair, we need to create
(K − 1) noise-free message block dimensions at each legitimate receiver. We ensure this by
systematically aligning the 2K noise symbols to occupy only (K + 1) block dimensions at
each legitimate receiver. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first achievable scheme
in the literature that uses two artificial noise blocks from each transmitter and then aligns
them to maximize the noise-free message dimensions at each legitimate receiver.
Let us now present the 3-user scheme in more detail. Let m be a large integer. Also, let
c1, c2, c3 and c4 be real constants drawn from a fixed continuous distribution with bounded
support independently of each other and of all the channel gains. This ensures that the cis
are rationally independent of each other and of the channel gains. Now, we define four sets
Ti, i = 1, . . . , 4, as follows:
T1
∆
= {hr1111 hr1212 hr1313 hr2121 hr3131 hr3232 hr3223 cs1 : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . , m}} (110)
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T2
∆
=
{
hr2121 h
r22
22 h
r23
23
(
h12
h11
)r12 (h13
h11
)r13
hr3131 h
r32
32 c
s
2 : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . , m}
}
(111)
T3
∆
=
{
hr3131 h
r32
32 h
r33
33
(
h21
h22
)r21 (h23
h22
)r23
hr1212 h
r13
13 c
s
3 : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . , m}
}
(112)
T4
∆
= {hr3131 hr3232 hr3333 hr2121 hr1212 hr1313 hr2323 cs4 : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . , m}} (113)
Let Mi be the cardinality of the set Ti. Note that all the Mis are the same, which we denote
by M , which is given as,
M
∆
= m8 (114)
We subdivide each message Wi into 2 independent sub-messages Vij, j = 1, . . . , 4, j 6= i, i+1.
For each transmitter i, let pij be the vector containing all the elements of Tj , for j 6= i, i+1.
For any given (i, j) with j 6= i, i + 1, pij represents the dimension along which message Vij
is sent. Further, at each transmitter i, let qi and q˜i be vectors containing all the elements
in sets Ti and βiTi+1, respectively, where
βi =


1
hii
, if i = 1, 2
1, if i = 3
(115)
The vectors qi and q˜i represent dimensions along which artificial noise symbols Ui and U˜i,
respectively, are sent. We define a 4M dimensional vector bi by stacking the pijs, qi and q˜i
as
bTi =
[
pTi1 . . .p
T
i(i−1) p
T
i(i+2) . . .pi4 qi q˜i
]
(116)
The transmitter encodes Vij using anM dimensional vector vij , and the cooperative jamming
signals Ui and U˜i using M dimensional vectors ui and u˜i, respectively. Each element of vij ,
ui and u˜i are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from C(a,Q) in (16). Let
aTi =
[
vTi1 . . .v
T
i(i−1) v
T
i(i+2) . . .vi4 ui u˜i
]
(117)
The channel input of transmitter i is then given by
xi = a
T
i b (118)
Let us now analyze the structure of the received signals at the receivers. For example,
consider receiver 1. The desired signals at receiver 1, v13 and v14 arrive along dimensions
h11T3 and h11T4, respectively. Since only Ti (and not Tj , j 6= i) contains ci, these dimensions
are rationally independent. Thus, they appear along different columns in Fig. 5. The
artificial noise symbols u1, u2, u3 and u˜3 arrive along dimensions h11T1, h21T2, h31T3 and
23
h31T4, respectively. Again they are all rationally separate and thus, appear along different
columns in Fig. 5. Further, they are all separate from the dimensions of the desired signals,
because T3 and T4 do not contain h11, while T1 and T2 do not contain either c3 or c4. On
the other hand, the unintended signals v21 and v31 arrive along h21T1 and h31T1, and since
T1 contains powers of h21 and h31, they align with the artificial noise u1 in T˜1, where,
T˜1
∆
= {hr1111 hr1212 hr1313 hr2121 hr3131 hr3232 hr3223 cs1 : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . , m+ 1}} (119)
Similarly, we define
T˜2
∆
=
{
hr2121 h
r22
22 h
r23
23
(
h12
h11
)r12 (h13
h11
)r13
hr3131 h
r32
32 c
s
2 : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . , m+ 1}
}
(120)
T˜3
∆
=
{
hr3131 h
r32
32 h
r33
33
(
h21
h22
)r21 (h23
h22
)r23
hr1212 h
r13
13 c
s
3 : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . , m+ 1}
}
(121)
T˜4
∆
= {hr3131 hr3232 hr3333 hr2121 hr1212 hr1313 hr2323 cs4 : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . , m+ 1}} (122)
We note that the unintended signals v32 and v24 arrive along h31T2 and h21T4 and thus, align
with u2 and u˜3, respectively, in T˜2 and T˜4. Thus, they appear in the same column in Fig.5.
Finally, the artificial noise symbols u˜1 and u˜2 align with u2 and u3, respectively.
At receiver 2, the desired signals v21 and v24 arrive along rationally independent dimen-
sions h22T1 and h22T4, respectively. The artificial noise symbols u1, u2, u3 and u˜3 arrive
along dimensions h12T1, h22T2, h32T3 and h32T4, respectively. Thus, they lie in dimensions
T˜1, T˜2, T˜3 and T˜4, respectively. They are all separate from the dimensions of the desired
signals, because T˜1 and T˜4 do not contain h22, while T˜2 and T˜3 do not contain either c1 or c4.
The artificial noise symbols u˜1 and u˜2 arrive along dimensions
(
h12
h11
)
T2 and T3, respectively;
thus, they align with u2 and u3 in T˜2 and T˜3, respectively. The unintended signals v13 and
v14 arrive along h12T3 and h12T4, respectively, and lie in T˜3 and T˜4, respectively. Similarly,
v31 and v32 lie in T˜1 and T˜2, respectively. A similar analysis is true for receiver 3 as well.
At the eavesdropper, there is no alignment, since the channel gains of the eavesdropper are
not known at the transmitters. In fact, the artificial noise symbols all arrive along different
dimensions at the receiver. Thus, heuristically, they exhaust the decoding capability of the
eavesdropper almost completely.
We note that the interference at each receiver is confined to the dimensions T˜1, T˜2, T˜3
and T˜4. Further, these dimensions are separate from the dimensions occupied by the desired
signals at each receiver. Specifically, at receiver i, the desired signals occupy dimensions
hiiTj , j 6= i, i + 1. These dimensions are separate from T˜i and T˜i+1, since only Tj contains
powers of cj . Further, T˜j, j 6= i, i+ 1 do not contain powers of hii. Thus, the set
S =
( ⋃
j 6=i,i+1
hiiTj
)⋃( 4⋃
j=1
T˜j
)
(123)
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has cardinality
MS = 2m
8 + 4(m+ 1)8 (124)
Intuitively, out of these MS dimensions, 2m
8 dimensions carry the desired signals. Thus,
the s.d.o.f. of each legitimate user pair is 2m
8
2m8+4(m+1)8
which approaches 1
3
as m→∞. Thus,
the sum s.d.o.f. is 1. We omit the formal calculation of the achievable rate here and instead
present it in Appendix C.1 for the general K-user case. Further, note that the unintended
messages at each receiver are buried in artificial noise, see Fig. 5. Thus, our scheme provides
confidentiality of messages from unintended legitimate receivers as well.
5.1.2 Fading Channel Gains
Our scheme uses asymptotic vector space alignment introduced in [7]. Let Γ = (K − 1)2 =
(3− 1)2 = 4. We use Mn = 2nΓ + 4(n + 1)Γ channel uses to transmit 6nΓ message symbols
securely to the legitimate receivers in the presence of the eavesdropper. Thus, we achieve a
sum s.d.o.f. of 6n
Γ
2nΓ+4(n+1)Γ
, which approaches 1 as n→∞.
First, at transmitter i, we divide its message Wi into 2 sub-messages Vij , j = 1, . . . , 4, j 6=
i, i+1. Each Vij is encoded into n
Γ independent streams vij(1), . . . , vij(n
Γ), which we denote
as vij
∆
=
(
vij(1), . . . , vij(n
Γ)
)T
. We also require artificial noise symbols Ui and U˜i at each
transmitter i. We encode the artificial noise symbols Ui and U˜i as
ui
∆
=
(
ui(1), . . . , ui((n+ 1)
Γ)
)T
, i = 1, 2, 3 (125)
u˜i
∆
=
(
u˜i(1), . . . , u˜i(n
Γ)
)T
, i = 1, 2 (126)
u˜3
∆
=
(
u˜i(1), . . . , u˜i((n+ 1)
Γ)
)T
(127)
In each channel use t ≤Mn, we choose precoding column vectors pij(t), qi(t) and q˜i(t) with
the same number of elements as vij , ui and u˜i, respectively. In channel use t, transmitter i
sends
Xi(t) =
∑
j 6=i,i+1
pij(t)
Tvij + qi(t)
Tui + q˜i(t)
T u˜i (128)
where we have dropped the limits on j in the summation for notational simplicity. By
stacking the precoding vectors for all Mn channel uses, we let,
Pij =


pij(1)
T
...
pTij(Mn)

 , Qi =


qi(1)
T
...
qi(Mn)
T

 , Q˜i =


q˜i(1)
T
...
q˜i(Mn)
T

 (129)
Now, lettingXi = (Xi(1), . . . , Xi(Mn))
T , the channel input for transmitter i overMn channel
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uses can be compactly represented as
Xi =
∑
j
Pijvij +Qiui + Q˜iu˜i (130)
Recall that, channel use t, the channel output at receiver l and the eavesdropper are,
respectively, given by
Yl(t) =
3∑
k=1
hkl(t)Xk(t) +Nl(t) (131)
Z(t) =
3∑
k=1
gk(t)Xk(t) +NZ(t) (132)
where we have dropped the Gaussian noise at high SNR. LetHkl
∆
= diag (hkl(1), . . . , hkl(Mn)).
Similarly, define Gk = diag (gk(1), . . . , gk(Mn)). The channel outputs at receiver l and the
eavesdropper over allMn channel uses,Yl = (Yl(1), . . . , Yl(Mn))
T and Z = (Z(1), . . . , Z(Mn))
T ,
respectively, can be represented by
Yl =
3∑
k=1
HklXk +Nl (133)
=
3∑
k=1
Hkl


4∑
j=1
j 6=k,k+1
Pkjvkj +Qkuk + Q˜ku˜k

+Nl (134)
=
4∑
j=1
j 6=l,l+1
HllPljvlj +
3∑
k=1
k 6=l
4∑
j=1
j 6=k,k+1
HklPkjvkj +
3∑
k=1
Hkl
(
Qkuk + Q˜ku˜k
)
+Nl (135)
and,
Z =
3∑
k=1
GkXk +NZ (136)
=
3∑
k=1
4∑
j=1
j 6=k,k+1
GkPkjvkj +
3∑
k=1
Gk
(
Qkuk + Q˜ku˜k
)
+NZ (137)
Now, receiver l wants to decode vlj, j = 1, . . . , 4, j 6= l, l + 1. Thus, the remaining terms
in (135) constitute interference at the lth receiver. Let CS(X) denote the column space of
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q˜3
Receiver 1
H21P21  H11Q1 H11Q˜1  H21Q2 H21Q˜2  H31Q3 H21P24  H31Q˜3
H31P31  H11Q1 H31P32  H21Q2
Receiver 2
H12Q˜1  H22Q2 H22Q˜2  H32Q3
H32P31  H12Q1 H32P32  H22Q2 H12P13  H32Q3 H12P14  H32Q˜3
Receiver 3
H23P21  H13Q1 H13Q˜1  H23Q2 H23Q˜2  H33Q3 H23P24  H33Q˜3
H13P13  H33Q3 H13P14  H33Q˜3
Table 2: Summary of alignment equations.
matrix X. Then, Il denoting the space spanned by this interference is given by
Il =
( ⋃
k 6=l,j 6=k,k+1
CS (HklPkj)
)⋃( 3⋃
k=1
CS (HklQk)
)⋃( 3⋃
k=1
CS
(
HklQ˜k
))
(138)
Note that there are 2nΓ symbols to be decoded by each legitimate receiver in 2nΓ+4(n+1)Γ
channel uses. Thus, for decodability, the interference can occupy a subspace of rank at most
4(n+ 1)Γ, that is,
rank(Il) ≤ 4(n+ 1)Γ (139)
To that end, we align the noise and message subspaces at each legitimate receiver appro-
priately. Note that no such alignment is possible at the external eavesdropper since the
transmitters do not have its CSI. In addition, note that we have a total of 2nΓ + 4(n + 1)Γ
artificial noise symbols which will span the full received signal space at the eavesdropper and
secure all the messages.
Fig. 5 shows the alignment we desire. We remark that the same figure represents the
alignment of signals both for real interference alignment and the vector space alignment
schemes. Now, let us enumerate the conditions for the desired signal alignment at each
receiver. From Fig. 5, it is clear that there are 6 alignment equations at each legitimate
receiver, corresponding to four unintended messages and two artificial noise symbols U˜1 and
U˜2. Table 2 shows the alignment equations for each legitimate receiver.
Now, me make the following selections:
P21 = P31
∆
=P˜1 (140)
P32
∆
=P˜2 (141)
P13
∆
=P˜3 (142)
P14 = P24
∆
=P˜4 (143)
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T1j T2j T3j T4j
j = 1 H−111H21 H
−1
21H31 H
−1
31H21H
−1
22H12 H
−1
31H21
j = 2 H−111H31 H
−1
22H12H
−1
11H31 H
−1
32H12 H
−1
32H12
j = 3 H−112H32 H
−1
22H32 H
−1
33H23H
−1
22H12 H
−1
33H23
j = 4 H−113H23 H
−1
23H13H
−1
11H31 H
−1
33H13 H
−1
33H13
Table 3: Values of Tij.
Q˜1 =H
−1
11H31P˜2 (144)
Q˜2 =H
−1
22H12P˜3 (145)
Note that (144) and (145) imply that the artificial noises u˜1 and u˜2 align exactly with
unintended message symbols v32 and v13 at receivers 1 and 2, respectively. With these
selections, it suffices to find matrices P˜i, i = 1, . . . , 4, Qi, i = 1, 2, 3, and Q˜3. The alignment
equations may now be written as
TijP˜i Qi, i = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, . . . , 4 (146)
T4jP˜4 Q˜3, j = 1, . . . , 4 (147)
where the Tijs are tabulated in Table 3, and the notation A  B is used to denote that
CS(A) ⊆ CS(B) for matrices A and B where CS(X) refers to the column space of the
matrix X.
We can now construct the matrices P˜i, i = 1, . . . , 4, Qi, i = 1, . . . , 3 and Q˜3 as in [7]
P˜i =
{(
4∏
j=1
T
αj
ij
)
wi : αj ∈ {1, . . . , n}
}
(148)
Qi =
{(
4∏
j=1
T
αj
ij
)
wi : αj ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1}
}
(149)
Q˜3 =
{(
4∏
j=1
T
αj
ij
)
w4 : αj ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1}
}
(150)
where each wi is the Mn × 1 column vector containing elements drawn independently from
a continuous distribution with bounded support. Note that an element in Pi is the product
of powers of some channel coefficients and an extra random variable, just like an element in
the sets Ti defined for the real interference scheme. Further, the set of channel coefficients
appearing inPi is the same as those contained in set Ti. Thus, there is a loose correspondence
between the real and vector space alignment techniques.
Now, consider the decodability of the desired signals at the receivers. For example,
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consider receiver 1. Due to the alignment conditions in Table 2, the interference subspace at
receiver 1 is given by
I1 =
[
H11Q1 H21Q2 H31Q3 H31Q˜3
]
(151)
The desired signal subspace, on the other hand, is
D1 =
[
H11P˜3 H11P˜4
]
(152)
For decodability, it suffices to show that
Λ1 = [D1 I1] (153)
is full rank. To do so, we use [31, Lemmas 1, 2]. Consider any row m of the matrix Λ1.
Note that the mth row of Hi1Qi contains the term wmi with exponent 1, but no wmj for
i 6= j, where wmi denotes the element in the mth row of wi. In fact, for i = 1, . . . , 4, the
term wmi occurs nowhere else in the matrix Λl except in Hi1Qi (H31Q˜3, when i = 4) and
H11P˜i. This shows that D1 and I1 have full column ranks individually. Further, the matrix[
H11P˜3 H31Q3
]
has full column rank because Q3 does not contain any elements of H11.
Similarly,
[
H11P˜4 H31Q˜3
]
is full column rank for the same reason. Thus, Λ1, which is a
Mn ×Mn matrix, is full column rank, and hence full rank. This ensures decodability of the
desired signals at receiver 1. a similar analysis holds for the other receivers as well.
The security of the message signals at the eavesdropper is ensured by the fact that the
artificial noises Qi and Q˜i, i = 1, 2, 3, do not align at the eavesdropper, and instead span
the full received signal space at the eavesdropper. Indeed, the Mn ×Mn matrix
IE =
[
G1Q1 G2Q2 G3Q3 G1Q˜1 G2Q˜2 G3Q˜3
]
(154)
is full rank. Thus, if Vi = {vij , j 6= i, i+ 1} denotes the collection of all messages of trans-
mitter i, and uT =
[
uT1 ,u
T
2 ,u
T
2 , u˜
T
1 , u˜
T
2 , u˜
T
3
]
,
I(V31;Z) =h(Z)− h(Z|V31) (155)
=h(Z)− h(IEu) (156)
≤Mn
2
logP − Mn
2
logP + o(logP ) (157)
=o(logP ) (158)
In the above calculation, we have dropped the conditioning on Ω for notational simplicity.
Now, by treating all Mn channel uses as 1 vector channel use, and using [4, Theorem 2], an
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achievable rate for the vector channel is
RMni =I(Vi;Yi)− I(Vi;Z|V−i) (159)
=2nΓ logP − o(logP ) (160)
where (160) follows since the 2nΓ symbols are decodable within noise variance, and since
I(Vi;Z|V−i) ≤ I(V31;Z) ≤ o(logP ). Thus, the rate 2n
Γ
Mn
is achievable per user pair per
channel use, which gives a sum s.d.o.f. of 6n
Γ
2nΓ+4(n+1)Γ
, which approaches 1, as n→∞.
We remark here that our scheme also provides confidentiality, that is, the messages from
transmitter i are kept secure from legitimate receiver j. We get this confidentiality without
any additional loss of rate, just as in the case when eavesdropper CSI is available at the
transmitters [4].
5.2 Converse for the Interference Channel
The steps of the converse are similar to that of the proof in Section 4.2. The notation here
is also the same as in Section 4.2. Again, we divide the proof into three steps.
5.2.1 Deterministic Channel Model
We consider the deterministic channel given as,
Yk(t) =
K∑
i=1
⌊hik(t)Xi(t)⌋ (161)
Z(t) =
K∑
i=1
⌊gi(t)Xi(t)⌋ (162)
for k = 1, . . . , K, with the constraint that
Xi(t) ∈
{
0, 1, . . . ,
⌊√
P
⌋}
(163)
We can show that there is no loss of s.d.o.f. in considering the channel in (161)-(162) instead
of the one in (8)-(9), as in Section 4.2.1. Thus, we will consider this deterministic channel in
the remaining part of the converse. Since all receivers know Ω, it appears in the conditioning
in every entropy and mutual information term below. We keep this in mind, but drop it for
the sake of notational simplicity.
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5.2.2 An Upper Bound on the Sum Rate
We begin as in the secrecy penalty lemma in [2], i.e., [2, Lemma 1]. Note that, unlike [2,
Lemma 1], channel inputs are integer here:
n
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤I(WK1 ;YK1 )− I(WK1 ;Z) + nǫ (164)
≤I(WK1 ;YK1 |Z) + nǫ (165)
≤I(XK1 ;YK1 |Z) + nǫ (166)
≤H(YK1 |Z) + nǫ (167)
=H(YK1 ,Z)−H(Z) + nǫ (168)
≤H(XK1 ,YK1 ,Z)−H(Z) + nǫ (169)
=H(XK1 )−H(Z) + nǫ (170)
≤
K∑
k=1
H(Xk)−H(Z) + nǫ (171)
where (170) follows since H(YK1 ,Z|XK1 ) = 0 for the channel in (161)-(162).
Also, to ensure decodability at the legitimate receiver, we use the role of a helper lemma
in [2], i.e., [2, Lemma 2],
nRi ≤I(Wi;Yi) + nǫ′ (172)
≤I(Xi;Yi) + nǫ′ (173)
=H(Yi)−H(Yi|Xi) + nǫ′ (174)
=H(Yi)−H(⌊hjXj⌋) + nǫ′ (175)
=H(Yi)−H(⌊hjXj⌋ ,Xj) +H(Xj| ⌊hjXj⌋) + nǫ′ (176)
≤H(Yi)−H(Xj) +H(Xj| ⌊hjXj⌋) + nǫ′ (177)
≤H(Yi)−H(Xj) +
n∑
t=1
H(Xj(t)| ⌊hj(t)Xj(t)⌋) + nǫ′ (178)
≤H(Yi)−H(Xj) + nǫ′ + nc (179)
for every i 6= j, where (179) follows using Lemma 2.
Let Π be any derangement of (1, . . . , n), and let j = Π(i). Then, using (179), we obtain,
K∑
k=1
H(Xk) ≤
K∑
k=1
H(Yk)− n
K∑
k=1
Rk + nK(ǫ
′ + c) (180)
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Using (180) in (171), we get,
2n
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤
K∑
k=1
H(Yk)−H(Z) + nK(ǫ′ + c) + nǫ (181)
≤(K − 1)n
2
logP + (H(YK)−H(Z)) + nǫ′′ (182)
where ǫ′′ = o(logP ). Dividing by n and letting n→∞,
2
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤(K − 1)1
2
logP + lim
n→∞
1
n
(H(YK)−H(Z)) + ǫ′′ (183)
Now dividing by 1
2
logP and taking P →∞,
K∑
i=1
di ≤K − 1
2
+
1
2
lim
P→∞
lim
n→∞
H(YK)−H(Z)
n
2
logP
(184)
5.2.3 Bounding the Difference of Entropies
As we did in Section 4.2.3, we enhance the system by relaxing the condition that chan-
nel inputs from different transmitters are mutually independent, and think of the K single
antenna terminals as a single transmitter with K antennas. Thus, we wish to maximize
H(YK) − H(Z), where YK and Z are two single antenna receiver outputs, under the con-
straint that the channel gains to Z are unknown at the transmitter. This again brings
us to the K-user MISO broadcast channel setting of [9]. We know from [9, eqns. (75)-
(103)] that even without any security or decodability constraints, the difference of entropies,
H(YK)−H(Z) cannot be larger than no(logP ), if the channel gains to the second receiver
is unknown. Thus,
H(YK)−H(Z) ≤ no(logP ) (185)
Using (185) in (184), we have
K∑
i=1
di ≤K − 1
2
(186)
This completes the converse proof of Theorem 3.
6 Proof of Theorem 4
In this section, we present achievable schemes that achieve sum s.d.o.f. of m(K−1)
m(K−1)+1
, when m
of the K transmitters have eavesdropper’s CSI, for both fixed and fading channel gains.
32
V12 V13 U1
U2
U3
U1
U2
U3
V21 V23
V12 V13 V21 V23
V21 V23
V12 V13
U1 U2 U3
X1 Y
X2
X3
Z
Figure 6: Alignment of signals when K = 3 and m = 2.
6.1 Fixed Channel Gains
With fixed channel gains, we provide a scheme based on real interference alignment that
achieves the required sum s.d.o.f. of m(K−1)
m(K−1)+1
. In particular, it achieves the s.d.o.f. tuple
(d1, . . . , dm, dm+1, . . . , dK) =
(
K−1
m(K−1)+1
, . . . , K−1
m(K−1)+1
, 0, . . . , 0
)
. We employ m(K − 1) +K
mutually independent random variables:
Vij, i = 1, . . . , m, j = 1, . . . , K, j 6= i
Uj, j = 1, . . . , K
uniformly drawn from the same PAM constellation C(a,Q) in (16). Transmitter i, i =
1, . . . , m transmits:
Xi =
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
gj
hjgi
Vij +
1
hi
Ui, i = 1, . . . , m (187)
while transmitters (m+ 1) to K transmit
Xi =
1
hi
Ui, i = m+ 1, . . . , K (188)
The channel outputs are given by,
Y =
m∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
higj
hjgi
Vij +
K∑
i=1
Ui +N1 (189)
Z =
K∑
i=1
gi
hi
(
Ui +
m∑
j=1,j 6=i
Vji
)
+N2 (190)
Intuitively, every Vij gets superimposed with Uj at the eavesdropper, thus securing it. This
is shown in Fig. 6. The proof of decodability and security guarantee follows exactly the proof
in [2, Section IX-B ] and is omitted here.
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6.2 Fading Channel Gains
We construct a scheme that achieves the desired sum s.d.o.f. Without loss of generality,
assume that the firstm transmitters have eavesdropper CSI, while the remaining transmitters
have no eavesdropper CSI. We provide a scheme to achieve the rate tuple (d1, . . . , dm, dm+1,
. . . , dK) =
(
K−1
m(K−1)+1
, . . . , K−1
m(K−1)+1
, 0, . . . , 0
)
, thus, achieving the required sum s.d.o.f. of
m(K−1)
m(K−1)+1
. For each i = 1, . . . , m, transmitter i sendsVi = {Vij, , j 6= i, j = 1, . . . , K} symbols
in m(K − 1) + 1 time slots. Let V = {Vi, i = 1, . . . , K}. Fig. 6 illustrates the alignment of
the signals at the end of the scheme when K = 3 and m = 2. The scheme is as follows:
At time t ∈ {1, . . . , m(K − 1) + 1}, the ith transmitter, i = 1, . . . , K, sends,
Xi(t) =


K∑
j=1,j 6=i
gj(t)
hj(t)gi(t)
Vij +
1
hi(t)
Ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ m
1
hi(t)
Ui, m+ 1 ≤ i ≤ K
(191)
where Ui is an artificial noise symbol. This ensures that the noise symbols Ui all align at the
legitimate receiver. On the other hand, the artificial noise symbol from the jth transmitter
Uj protects all the messages Vij for every i, at the eavesdropper. The channel outputs are
given by,
Y (t) =
m∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
hi(t)gj(t)
hj(t)gi(t)
Vij +
K∑
i=1
Ui +N1(t) (192)
Z(t) =
K∑
i=1
gi(t)
hi(t)
(
Ui +
m∑
j=1,j 6=i
Vji
)
+N2(t) (193)
After the m(K − 1) + 1 time slots, the legitimate receiver ends up with m(K − 1) + 1
linearly independent equations with m(K − 1) + 1 variables: ∑Ki=1 Ui and the m(K − 1)
variables {Vij}. Thus, it can decode all the m(K − 1) message symbols Vij . Defining
Y = {Y (t), t = 1, . . . , m(K − 1) + 1} and Z similarly as Y, this means that I(V;Y) =
m(K− 1)1
2
logP + o(logP ), and also I(V;Z) ≤ o(logP ), concluding the achievability proof.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we established the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for three channel models: the wire-
tap channel with M helpers, the K-user multiple access wiretap channel, and the K-user
interference channel with an external eavesdropper, in the absence of eavesdropper’s CSIT.
While there is no loss in the s.d.o.f. for the wiretap channel with helpers in the absence of the
eavesdropper’s CSIT, the s.d.o.f. decreases in the cases of the multiple access wiretap channel
and the interference channel with an external eavesdropper. We show that in the absence of
eavesdropper’s CSIT, the K-user multiple access wiretap channel is equivalent to a wiretap
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channel with (K − 1) helpers from a sum s.d.o.f. perspective. The question of optimality
of the sum s.d.o.f. when some but not all of the transmitters have the eavesdropper’s CSIT
remains a subject of future work.
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1
Since AX+N is a jointly Gaussian random vector with zero-mean and covariance PAAT +
σ2I, we have [32],
h(AX+N) =
1
2
log(2πe)M
∣∣PAAT + σ2I∣∣ (194)
=
1
2
log(2πe)M
∣∣PWΣWT + σ2I∣∣ (195)
=
1
2
r∑
i=1
log
(
λiP + σ
2
)
+ o(logP ) (196)
=r
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (197)
where we note thatAAT is positive semi-definite, with an eigenvalue decompositionWΣWT ,
where Σ is a diagonal matrix with r non-zero entries λ1, . . . , λr.
Appendix B Proof of Lemma 2
First, note that
H(X| ⌊hX⌋ , h) = Eh
[
H(X| ⌊hX⌋ , h = h˜)
]
(198)
Now, for a fixed h, let us define Sh(ν) as the set of all realizations of X such that ⌊hX⌋ = ν,
i.e., Sh(ν)
∆
=
{
i ∈
{
1, . . . , ⌊√P ⌋
}
: ⌊ih⌋ = ν
}
. Then,
H
(
X| ⌊hX⌋ , h = h˜
)
≤ log |Sh˜(⌊h˜X⌋)| (199)
For any ν, we can upper-bound |Sh˜(ν)| as follows: Let, i1 and i2 be the minimum and
maximum elements of Sh˜(ν). Then, ⌊i1h˜⌋ = ⌊i2h˜⌋ implies that (i2− i1)|h˜| < 1, which means
(i2 − i1) < 1|h˜| . Hence,
|Sh˜(ν)| ≤i2 − i1 + 1 (200)
<1 +
1
|h˜| (201)
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Thus, using (198) and (199), we have,
H (X| ⌊hX⌋ , h) ≤Eh
[
log
(
1 +
1
|h|
)]
≤ c (202)
where c is a constant independent of P .
Appendix C Achievability for the K-user Interference
Channel with an External Eavesdropper
Here, we present the general achievable schemes for the K-user interference channel with an
external eavesdropper.
C.1 Fixed Channel Gains
Let m be a large constant. We pick (K + 1) points c1, . . . , cK+1 in an i.i.d. fashion from a
continuous distribution with bounded support. Then, c1, . . . , cK+1 are rationally independent
almost surely. Let us define sets Ti, for i = 1, . . . , K +1, which will represent dimensions as
follows:
T1
∆
=
{(
K∏
k=1
hr1k1k
)(
K∏
j,k=1,j 6=1,k
h
rjk
jk
)
cs1 : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . , m}
}
(203)
Ti
∆
=


(
K∏
k=1
hrikik
)(
K∏
k=2
(
h(i−1)k
h(i−1)1
)r(i−1)k)


K∏
j,k=1
j 6=i,i−1,k
h
rjk
jk

 csi : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . , m}

 ,
i = 2, . . . , K − 1 (204)
TK
∆
=


(
K∏
k=1
hrKkKk
)(
K∏
k=1,k 6=2
(
h(K−1)k
h(K−1)2
)r(K−1)k)


K∏
j,k=1
j 6=K,K−1,k
h
rjk
jk

 csK : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . , m}


(205)
TK+1
∆
=
{(
K∏
k=1
hrKkKk
)(
K∏
j,k=1,j 6=K,k
h
rjk
jk
)
csK+1 : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . , m}
}
(206)
Let Mi be the cardinality of Ti. Note that all Mi are the same, thus we denote them as M ,
M
∆
= m2+K(K−1) (207)
First, we divide each message into many sub-messages; specifically, the message of the ith
transmitter, Wi, is divided into (K − 1) sub-messages Vij , j = 1, . . . , K + 1, j 6= i, i+ 1. For
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T1 T2 T3 T4 Tj−1 Tj Tj+1 Tj+2
U1 U˜1 V13 V14
V21 U2 U˜2 V24
Ti Ti+1 TK+1
Tx 1
Tx 2
V1KV1(j−1) V1j V1(j+1) V1(j+2) V1i V1(i+1)
V2KV2(j−1) V2j V2(j+1) V2(j+2) V2i V2(i+1)
Tx j Vj1 Vj2 Vj3 Vj4 Vj(j−1) Uj U˜j Vj(j+2) Vji Vj(i+1) VjK
Tx i Ui U˜i
Tx K VK1 VK2 VK3 VK4 VK(j−1) VK(j+2) VKi VK(i+1) U˜KVKj VK(j+1)
Figure 7: Alignment of interference signals at receiver i.
each transmitter i, let pij be the vector containing all the elements of Tj , for j 6= i, i + 1.
For any given (i, j) with j 6= i, i + 1, pij represents the dimension along which message Vij
is sent. Further, at each transmitter i, let qi and q˜i be vectors containing all the elements
in sets Ti and βiTi+1, respectively, where
βi =


h(i+2)1
hi1
, if 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 2
h12
hi2
, if i = K − 1
1, if i = K
(208)
The vectors qi and q˜i represent dimensions along which artificial noise symbols Ui and U˜i,
respectively, are sent. We define a (K + 1)M dimensional vector bi by stacking the pijs, qi
and q˜i as
bTi =
[
pTi1 . . .p
T
i(i−1) p
T
i(i+2) . . .pi(K+1) qi q˜i
]
(209)
The transmitter encodes Vij using anM dimensional vector vij , and the cooperative jamming
signals Ui and U˜i using M dimensional vectors ui and u˜i, respectively. Each element of vij ,
ui and u˜i are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from C(a,Q) in (16). Let
aTi =
[
vTi1 . . .v
T
i(i−1) v
T
i(i+2) . . .vi(K+1) ui u˜i
]
(210)
The channel input of transmitter i is then given by
xi = a
T
i b (211)
Let us now analyze the structure of the received signals at the legitimate receivers. The
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alignment of the interfering signal spaces at receiver i is shown in Fig. 7. The ith row depicts
the signals originating from transmitter i. The signals in the same column align together at
the receiver. For simplicity of exposition, let us consider receiver 1.
At the first receiver, the desired signals v13, . . ., v1(K+1) come along dimensions h11T3, . . .,
h11TK+1, respectively. These dimensions are separate almost surely, since Ti contains powers
of ci while Tj, j 6= i does not. Thus, they correspond to separate boxes in the Fig. 5 forK = 3.
For the same reason, cooperative jamming signals u1, . . ., uK , u˜K , which arrive along the
dimensions h11T1, . . ., hK1TK , hK1TK+1 occupy different dimensions almost surely. Further,
the message signals v13, . . . ,v1(K+1), and the cooperative jamming signals u1, . . . ,uK , u˜K do
not overlap, since none of T3 . . . , TK+1 contain h11. Thus, they appear as separate boxes in
Fig. 5.
Now, let us consider the signals that are not desired at receiver 1. A signal vkl, k 6= 1, K+1
arrives at receiver 1 along hk1Tl. If we define
T˜1
∆
=
{(
K∏
k=1
hr1k1k
)(
K∏
j,k=1,j 6=1,k
h
rjk
jk
)
cs1 : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . , m+ 1}
}
(212)
T˜i
∆
=


(
K∏
k=1
hrikik
)(
K∏
k=2
(
h(i−1)k
h(i−1)1
)r(i−1)k)


K∏
j,k=1
j 6=i,i−1,k
h
rjk
jk

 csi : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . , m+ 1}

 ,
i = 2, . . . , K − 1 (213)
T˜K
∆
=


(
K∏
k=1
hrKkKk
) K∏
k=1,k 6=2
m=K−1
(
hmk
hm2
)rmk


K∏
j,k=1
j 6=K,K−1,k
h
rjk
jk

 csK : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . , m+ 1}


(214)
T˜K+1
∆
=
{(
K∏
k=1
hrKkKk
)(
K∏
j,k=1,j 6=K,k
h
rjk
jk
)
csK+1 : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . , m+ 1}
}
(215)
we notice that the dimensions in hk1Tl, k 6= 1 are subsets of T˜l, as is hl1Tl for every l =
1, . . . , K. Thus, each vkl aligns with ul in T˜l, for l = 1, . . . , K, as is shown in Fig. 7. Further,
a signal vk(K+1), k 6= 1, K, arrives along the dimensions hk1TK+1, k 6= 1 which is a subset
of T˜K+1, as is hK1TK+1, along which u˜K arrives. Thus, each vk(K+1), k 6= 1, K aligns with
u˜K , see Fig. 7. Finally, the cooperative jamming signals u˜1, . . . , u˜K−2, and u˜K−1 arrive at
receiver 1 along dimensions h31T2, . . ., hK1TK−1, and h12
(
h(K−1)1
h(K−1)2
)
TK , respectively, which
are all in T˜2 . . ., T˜K−1 and T˜K , respectively. Thus, the signal u˜i, i = 1, . . . , K − 1 align with
ui+1 in T˜i+1, which is seen in Fig. 5 for K = 3, and in Fig. 7 for general K.
We further note that the sets h11T3, . . ., h11TK+1, T˜1, . . ., T˜K+1 are all separable since
only Ti and T˜i (and not Tj or T˜j) contain powers of ci, and none of T˜3, . . ., T˜K+1 contains
h11. A similar observation holds for the received signal at any of the remaining receivers.
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Thus, the set
S =
(
K+1⋃
i=3
h11Ti
)⋃(K+1⋃
i=1
T˜i
)
(216)
has cardinality given by
Ms = (K − 1)mK(K−1)+2 + (K + 1)(m+ 1)K(K−1)+2 (217)
At the external eavesdropper, there is no alignment and the cooperative jamming signals
occupy the full space, thereby exhausting the decoding capability of the eavesdropper. This
secures all the messages at the external eavesdropper.
We next provide an analysis for the achievable sum rate. Since we have only one eaves-
dropper, we use [4, Theorem 2] and observe that the rate
Ri = I(Vi; Yi)− I(Vi;Z|V−i) (218)
is achievable, where Vi ia an auxiliary random variable satisfying Vi → Xi → Y, Z, and V−i
denotes the collection {Vj, j 6= i}. Note that since Ω is known at all the legitimate receivers
and the eavesdropper, and since Vis are chosen to be independent of Ω, Ω should appear
in the conditioning of each of the mutual information quantities in (218). We keep this in
mind, but drop it for the sake of notational simplicity.
First, we can upper bound the probability of error at each receiver. Let
Vi
∆
=
(
vi1 . . .vi(i−1) vi(i+2) . . .vi(K+1)
)
(219)
Then, for any δ > 0, there exists a positive constant γ, which is independent of P , such that
if we choose Q = P
1−δ
2(MS+δ) and a = γP
1
2
Q
, then for almost all channel gains the average power
constraint is satisfied and the probability of error is bounded by
Pr(Vi 6= Vˆi) ≤ exp
(−ηγiP δ) (220)
where ηγi is a positive constant which is independent of P and Vˆi is the estimate for Vi
obtained by choosing the closest point in the constellation based on observation Yi.
By Fano’s inequality and the Markov chain Vi → Yi → Vˆi, we know that,
I(Vi; Yi) ≥ I(Vi; Vˆi) (221)
= H(Vi)−H(Vi|Vˆi) (222)
= log(|Vi|)−H(Vi|Vˆi) (223)
≥ log(|Vi|)− 1− Pr(Vi 6= Vˆi) log(|Vi|) (224)
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=
[
1− Pr(Vi 6= Vˆi)
]
log(|Vi|)− 1 (225)
= log(|Vi|)− o(logP ) (226)
=
(K − 1)M(1 − δ)
MS + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (227)
where o(·) is the little-o function, Vi is the alphabet of Vi and, in this case, the cardinality
of Vi is (2Q+ 1)(K−1)M = (2Q+ 1)(K−1)mK(K−1)+2 . Here, M is defined in (207).
Now, we bound the second term in (218). Let
U
∆
= {ui, u˜i, i = 1, . . . , K} (228)
We have,
I(Vi;Z|V−i) =I(Vi, U ;Z|V−i)− I(U ;Z|V K1 ) (229)
=h(Z)− h(Z|U, V K1 )−H(U |V K1 ) +H(U |Z, V K1 ) (230)
≤1
2
logP − h(NZ)−H(U) + o(logP ) (231)
=
1
2
logP −H(U) + o(logP ) (232)
=
1
2
logP − log(2Q+ 1)2KM + o(logP ) (233)
=
1
2
logP − (1− δ)2KM
2(MS + δ)
logP + o(logP ) (234)
Now, combining (227) and (234), we have,
Ri ≥ 2Km
K(K−1)+2 − (K + 1)(m+ 1)K(K−1)+2 −Mδ(3K − 1)
(K − 1)mK(K−1) + (K + 1)(m+ 1)K(K−1)+2
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP )
(235)
By choosing δ small enough and choosing m large enough, we can make Ri arbitrarily close
to K−1
2K
. Thus, the sum s.d.o.f. of K−1
2
is achievable with fixed channel gains.
C.2 Fading Channel Gains
Here, we present a scheme that achieves K−1
2
s.d.o.f. using asymptotic vector space alignment
with channel extension. Let Γ = (K − 1)2. We use Mn = (K − 1)nΓ + (K + 1)(n + 1)Γ
channel uses to transmit K(K − 1)nΓ message symbols securely to the legitimate receivers
in the presence of the eavesdropper. Thus, we achieve a sum s.d.o.f. of K(K−1)n
Γ
(K−1)nΓ+(K+1)(n+1)Γ
,
which gets arbitrarily close to K−1
2
as n→∞.
First, we divide each message into many sub-messages; specifically, the message of the
ith transmitter, Wi, is divided into (K − 1) sub-messages Vij , j = 1, . . . , K + 1, j 6= i, i+ 1.
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Each Vij is encoded into n
Γ independent streams vij(1), . . . , vij(n
Γ), which we denote as
vij
∆
=
(
vij(1), . . . , vij(n
Γ)
)T
. We also require artificial noise symbols Ui and U˜i at each
transmitter i. Again, we encode the artificial noise symbols Ui and U˜i as
ui
∆
=
(
ui(1), . . . , ui((n + 1)
Γ)
)T
, i = 1, . . . , K (236)
u˜i
∆
=
(
u˜i(1), . . . , u˜i(n
Γ)
)T
, i = 1, . . . , K − 1 (237)
u˜K
∆
=
(
u˜i(1), . . . , u˜i((n + 1)
Γ)
)T
(238)
In each channel use t ≤Mn, we choose precoding column vectors pij(t), qi(t) and q˜i(t) with
the same number of elements as vij , ui and u˜i, respectively. In channel use t, transmitter i
sends
Xi(t) =
∑
j
pij(t)
Tvij + qi(t)
Tui + q˜i(t)
T u˜i (239)
where we have dropped the limits on j in the summation for notational simplicity. By
stacking the precoding vectors for all Mn channel uses, we let,
Pij =


pij(1)
T
...
pTij(Mn)

 , Qi =


qi(1)
T
...
qi(Mn)
T

 , Q˜i =


q˜i(1)
T
...
q˜i(Mn)
T

 (240)
Now, letting Xi = (Xi(1), . . . , Xi(Mn))
T , the channel input for all transmitter i over Mn
channel uses can be compactly represented as
Xi =
∑
j
Pijvij +Qiui + Q˜iu˜i (241)
Recall that, channel use t, the channel output at receiver l and the eavesdropper are,
respectively, given by
Yl(t) =
K∑
k=1
hkl(t)Xk(t) +Nl(t) (242)
Z(t) =
K∑
k=1
gk(t)Xk(t) +NZ(t) (243)
Let Hkl
∆
= diag (hkl(1), . . . , hkl(Mn)). Similarly, define Gk = diag (gk(1), . . . , gk(Mn)). The
channel outputs at receiver l and the eavesdropper over allMn channel uses, Yl = (Yl(1), . . . ,
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Yl(Mn))
T and Z = (Z(1), . . . , Z(Mn))
T , respectively, can be represented by
Yl =
K∑
k=1
HklXk +Nl (244)
=
K∑
k=1
Hkl


K+1∑
j=1
j 6=k,k+1
Pkjvkj +Qkuk + Q˜ku˜k

+Nl (245)
=
K+1∑
j=1
j 6=l,l+1
HllPljvlj +
K∑
k=1
k 6=l
K+1∑
j=1
j 6=k,k+1
HklPkjvkj +
K∑
k=1
Hkl
(
Qkuk + Q˜ku˜k
)
+Nl (246)
and,
Z =
K∑
k=1
GkXk +NZ (247)
=
K∑
k=1
K+1∑
j=1
j 6=k,k+1
GkPkjvkj +
K∑
k=1
Gk
(
Qkuk + Q˜ku˜k
)
+NZ (248)
Note that receiver l wants to decode vlj , j = 1, . . . , K+1, j 6= l, l+1. Thus, the remaining
terms in (246) constitute interference at the lth receiver. Recall that CS(X) denotes the
column space of the matrix X. Then, Il denoting the space spanned by this interference is
Il =
( ⋃
k 6=l,j 6=k,k+1
CS (HklPkj)
)⋃( K⋃
k=1
CS (HklQk)
)⋃( K⋃
k=1
CS
(
HklQ˜k
))
(249)
Note that there are (K − 1)nΓ symbols to be decoded by each legitimate receiver in (K −
1)nΓ + (K + 1)(n + 1)Γ channel uses. Thus, for decodability, the interference can occupy a
subspace of rank at most (K + 1)(n+ 1)Γ, that is,
rank(Il) ≤ (K + 1)(n+ 1)Γ (250)
To that end, we align the noise and message subspaces at each legitimate receiver appropri-
ately. Note that no such alignment is possible at the external eavesdropper since the trans-
mitters do not have its CSI. However, note that we have a total of (K−1)nΓ+(K+1)(n+1)Γ
artificial noise symbols which will span the full received signal space at the eavesdropper and
secures all the messages.
Fig. 5 shows the alignment for K = 3 receivers. For the general K-user case, Fig. 7 shows
the alignment in the interfering signal dimensions. At receiver l, it is as follows: First, the
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artificial noise symbols u˜k is aligned with uk+1, for every k = 1, . . . , K − 1. Thus, we have,
HklQ˜k  H(k+1)lQ(k+1), k = 1, . . . , K − 1 (251)
where A  B is used to denote that CS(A) ⊆ CS(B). Thus, the subspace spanned by the
artificial noise symbols can have a rank of at most (K + 1)(n+ 1)Γ.
The unwanted message symbols vkj, k 6= l, are aligned with uj if j ≤ K, or u˜K otherwise.
Thus,
HklPkj  HjlQj , j ≤ K (252)
HklPk(K+1)  HKlQ˜K (253)
for each k 6= l. Since, the unwanted messages at each receiver are aligned under the artificial
noise subspaces, they do not increase the rank of Il any further.
We can group the alignment equations for the artificial noise uk, k = 1, . . . , K, and u˜K
for all K legitimate receivers. For u1, we have,
HklPk1  H1lQ1, k ∈ {2, . . . , K} , l ∈ {1, . . . , K} , l 6= k (254)
Clearly, these are (K − 1)2 alignment equations. Similarly, we have (K − 1)2 alignment
equations for u˜K , given by
HklPk(K+1)  HKlQ˜K , k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1} , l ∈ {1, . . . , K} , l 6= k (255)
For the artificial noises uk, k = 2, . . . , K, we have the following alignment equations:
H(k−1)lQ˜k−1  HklQk (256)
HilPik  HklQk, i 6= k − 1, k, l 6= i (257)
Thus, there are (K − 1)2 + 1 alignment equations for each uk, k = 2, . . . , K. Now we make
the following selections:
Pk1 =P˜1, k = 2, . . . , K (258)
Pk(K+1) =P˜K+1, k = 1, . . . , K − 1 (259)
Pik =P˜k, i 6= k − 1, k, k = 2, . . . , K (260)
H(k−1)1Q˜k−1 =H(k+1)1P˜k, k = 2, . . . , K − 1 (261)
H(K−1)2Q˜K−1 =H12P˜K (262)
Now, note that it suffices to choose the matrices P˜k, k = 1, . . . , K +1 in order to specify all
the precoding matrices. Using these selections in our alignment equations in (254), (255),
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(256) and (257), we have (K − 1)2 alignment equations for each uk, k = 1, . . . , K and u˜K ,
given by,
TkP˜k Qk, Tk ∈ τk, k = 1, . . . , K (263)
TK+1P˜K+1 Q˜K , TK+1 ∈ τK+1 (264)
where the sets τk, k = 1, . . . , K + 1 are given by
τ1 =
{
H−11l Hkl, k ∈ {2, . . . , K} , l ∈ {1, . . . , K} , l 6= k
}
(265)
τK+1 =
{
H−1KlHkl, k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1} , l ∈ {1, . . . , K} , l 6= k
}
(266)
τk =τ
P
k
⋃
τQk (267)
where,
τPk =
{
H−1kl Hil, i /∈ {k − 1, k} , l 6= i, l ∈ {1, . . . , K}
}
(268)
τQk =


{
H−1kl H(k−1)lH
−1
(k−1)1H(k+1)1, l ∈ {1, . . . , K}
}
, if k ∈ {2, . . . , K − 1}{
H−1KlH(K−1)lH
−1
(K−1)2H12, l ∈ {1, . . . , K}
}
, if k = K
(269)
We can now construct the matrices P˜k, k = 1, . . . , K +1, Qk, k = 1, . . . , K and Q˜K as in [7]
P˜k =
{(∏
T∈τk
TαT
)
wk : αT ∈ {1, . . . , n}
}
(270)
Qk =
{(∏
T∈τk
TαT
)
wk : αT ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1}
}
(271)
Q˜K =



 ∏
T∈τK+1
TαT

wK+1 : αT ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1}

 (272)
where each wk is theMn×1 column vector containing elements drawn independently from a
continuous distribution with bounded support. This completes the description of our scheme.
Decodability: By our construction, the interference space at legitimate receiver l is
given by,
Il =
(
K⋃
k=1
CS(HklQk)
)⋃(
CS(HKlQ˜K)
)
(273)
and clearly,
rank(Il) ≤ (K + 1)(n+ 1)Γ (274)
44
We only need to show that desired signals vlj, j 6= l, l + 1 fall outside Il. The desired signal
space at receiver l is given by
Dl =
[
HllP˜1 . . .HllP˜l−1 HllP˜l+2 . . . ,HllP˜K
]
(275)
We want to show that the matrix
Λl =
[
Dl I˜l
]
(276)
where,
I˜l =
[
H1lQ1 . . .HKlQK HKlQ˜K
]
(277)
is full rank almost surely. To do so, we will use [31, Lemmas 1, 2]. Note that the mth row of
HklQk contains the term wmk with exponent 1, but no wmk′ for k 6= k′, where wmk denotes
the element in the mth row of wk. In fact, the term wmk occurs nowhere else in the matrix Λl
except inHklQk andHllP˜k. This shows, using [31, Lemmas 1, 2], thatDl and I˜l are full rank
almost surely. Further, it suffices to show that the matrices
[
HllP˜k HklQk
]
, k = 1, . . . , K,
and
[
HllP˜K+1 HKlQ˜K
]
are all full column rank. First,
[
HllP˜1 HklQ1
]
is full column
rank since HklQ1 misses the term Hll. Similarly,
[
HllP˜K+1 HKlQ˜1
]
is full column rank.
Further, if k 6= l, l+1, HklQk does not contain Hll and hence
[
HllP˜k HklQk
]
is full column
rank. Finally, note that the lth transmitter does not transmit any message signals along P˜k,
when k = l, l + 1. Thus, the matrix Λl is full rank almost surely. This ensures decodability
of the desired signals at each receiver.
Security guarantee: Let v = {vij , i, j ∈ {1, . . . , K} , j 6= i, i+ 1}, that is, v is the
collection of all legitimate messages to be secured from the eavesdropper. Also, let u =
{uk, u˜k, k = 1, . . . , K}, that is u is the collection of all the artificial noise symbols. We note
that
I(v;Z) =h(Z)− h(Z|v) (278)
≤Mn
2
logP − h(Au) + o(logP ) (279)
=
Mn
2
logP − Mn
2
logP + o(logP ) (280)
=o(logP ) (281)
where A is a Mn×Mn full rank matrix, and we have used Lemma 1 in (280). Also, we have
implicitly used the fact that Ω appears in the conditioning of each mutual information and
differential entropy term in the above calculation. Now, as before, by treating the vector
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channel with Mn slots as one channel use, and using wiretap channel codes, we get,
Ri ≥ (K − 1)n
Γ
Mn
logP + o(logP ) (282)
for each i = 1, . . . , K, which gives us the required sum s.d.o.f. of K(K−1)n
Γ
(K−1)nΓ+(K+1)(n+1)Γ
, which
approaches K−1
2
as n→∞.
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